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Abstract. There have been great efforts in studying the cascading be-
havior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game the-
oretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strate-
gies: A (the innovation) and B (the status quo) and get payoff from their
neighbors for coordination, it has long been known that the Price of
Anarchy (PoA) of this game is not 1, since the Nash equilibrium (NE)
where all players take B (B Nash) is inferior to the one all players taking
A (A Nash). However, no quantitative analysis has been performed to
give an accurate upper bound of PoA in this game.
In this paper, we adopt a widely used networked coordination game
setting [3] to study how bad a Nash equilibrium can be and give a tight
upper bound of the PoA of such games. We show that there is an NE that
is slightly worse than the B Nash. On the other hand, the PoA is bounded
and the worst NE cannot be much worse than the B Nash. In addition,
we discuss how the PoA upper bound would change when compatibility
between A and B is introduced, and show an intuitive result that the
upper bound strictly decreases as the compatibility is increased.
Keywords: Price of Anarchy, Social Cascading Behavior, Innovation
Diffusion, Networked Coordination Game
1 Introduction
There have been intensive studies on social networks recently that range over
many different facets of a social network, including microscopic and macroscopic
structures [1,14], evolution and dynamics [12,8], among others.
Particularly, it attracts a lot of interest to study how information or influence
spreads in a social network. The diffusion of information or behavior within a
network is ubiquitous and has profound significance to study. The procedure of
how a new technology emerges and prevails, the adoption of a political stance
among the population, the dissemination of a new social convention, all of these
processes, ranging from how smartphones prevailed in such an astounding speed,
to how the convention of RT was adopted across Twitter, can be modeled as a
cascading behavior in a social network.
Back in 1970s, Granovetter [5] started to formulate mathematical models for
the spreading process of collective behavior. Together with a lineage of later
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works, they aimed at predicting the success or failure of the diffusion. Granovet-
ter proposed a threshold-based model, which has been adopted and extended
since then. The key idea is that there is a global threshold indicating the neces-
sary proportion of neighbors of a given person adopting the innovation in order
to convince that given person to conform. One can thus investigate problems
such as how should we select initial nodes of the new behavior to maximize its
diffusion [9,10].
Some more relevant work tackles this problem from a game-theoretic per-
spective, in which each player has a set of actions to choose from and her utility
depends on the interaction between her and her neighbors.
Ellison [3] studied the simple case where all players form a chain and each
player has two actions (the innovation and the status quo). He showed that the
threshold 12 suffice to ensure the new action will spread to the entire graph. Some
later work extended the research to lattices [2]. Morris [13] discussed the case
of general graphs. He focused mainly on the global threshold as well, such as
for which thresholds would there be a Nash equilibrium where both actions are
simultaneously played.
These game theoretic models could result in a similar threshold based con-
tagion, but adopted a different perspective and focused on different aspects. For
instance, a threshold-based model is often ready to provide an algorithm to se-
lect proper nodes to start the innovation in order to maximize the diffusion,
while a game-theoretic model studies how individuals interact which does not
necessarily have this feature.
Recently there is another lineage of work [4,6] that studies the Price of An-
archy of the competitive cascade games. A major distinction is that they take a
different perspective in terms of game setting, in which competition is the cen-
tral concern. For instance, Apple and Samsung are marketing their smartphones
to the users. In this competitive setting, the players are no longer the users in
the graph, but are the companies aiming at maximizing the adoption of their
products. In our example, players are Apple and Samsung, and their strategies
are the selection of the initial adoption of their products (seeds).
Under this setting, Goyal and Kearns [4] showed that the two-player com-
petitive cascade game has a PoA upper-bounded by 4. And in [6], a tighter and
more general bound is proposed that the PoA has an upper-bound of 2 for an
arbitrary number of players.
Different from this competitive setting, our work will stick to the traditional
game settings where users are modeled as players, in order to study how users
react to the diffusion to an innovation spread through the network. We mainly fo-
cus on the stable states of the network, Nash Equilibria in the game, rather than
the result or the speed of diffusion in the network [9,11] to better understand
the relation between Nash equilibria and the optimal social welfare.
We now present our main results in a networked coordination game to model
the influences between behaviors of individuals in social networks and how bad
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a Nash Equilibrium (NE) can get in these games. Some of the questions that
can be answered in this paper include:
– Is there an NE worse than the one that all players take the status quo?
– If there is, what is the worst NE and how bad can it be?
Specifically, we show a tight upper bound of the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the
game. It is challenging because there could be numerous NEs in this game due
to the heterogeneity of the network topologies.
We show that there can be an NE worse than the one all taking the status
quo, but only by a small margin. Furthermore, we study the effect of introducing
compatibility between the two strategies, and conclude that as the compatibility
increases, the upper bound of PoA gets lower, which matches the intuition that
the compatibility will diminish the transferring barrier and make it easier to
switch to the innovation, thus resulting in lower PoA.
2 Game Setting
We adopt a typical networked coordination game [3] setting to model the in-
fluences between behaviors of individuals. Consider an undirected graph G =
(V,E), in which the nodes are the individuals in the population, and edges de-
note that they are friends whose behaviors would influence each other. This is
a simple model of a social network. We will consider a well concerned situa-
tion [3,11], where each node has two behaviors: the new behavior (innovation)
labeled as A, and the old behavior (status quo) labeled as B. Each pair of adja-
cent individuals (v, w) would receive a payoff from each other according to the
following rules:
– if both v and w have the same new behavior A, they each receive a payoff
α, where α is a positive real number.
– if both v and w have the same old behaviors B, they each receive a payoff
β, where β is a positive real number and β ≤ α.
– if v and w have different behaviors, they receive payoff γ, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ β,
which can be interpreted as the compatibility between the innovation and
the status quo.
The utility of each individual is the sum of payoffs she received from all her
neighbors according to the aforementioned rules.
This can then be intuitively formulated as a game Γ (u1, u2, · · · , up) for p ≥ 2
players (individuals). Then the set of players is V = {v1, v2, · · · , vp}, the set of
strategies (behaviors) of the player vi is Si = {A,B}, and the payoff function of
the player i is ui : S → R, where S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sp is the set of strategy
profiles, and R denotes the set of real numbers. To define the ui, we first define
a weight W (si, sj) of each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E as a function of the used strategies
(si, sj) of its two endpoints. W (si, sj) can be defined as the following payoff
matrix:
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A B
A α γ
B γ β
Then given a strategy vector, s ∈ S, the total payoff of each player ui(s) and
the social welfare SW (s) are defined as follows:
ui(s) =
∑
j,(vi,vj)∈E
W (si, sj),
SW (s) =
∑
i,vi∈V
ui.
3 Upper Bound for Price of Anarchy
In this section, we will show a tight upper bound of the PoA of the game Γ . We
first define three types of edges in the graph as follows:
Definition 3.1. The edge (vi, vj) linking two players using the same strategy
A, i.e., weighted α, is called A-edge denoted as ea.
The edge (vi, vj) linking two players using the same strategy B, i.e., weighted
β, is called B-edge denoted as eb.
The edge (vi, vj) linking two players using the different strategies, i.e., weighted
γ, is called C-edge denoted as ec.
Definition 3.2. Then the total payoff of each player and the social welfare can
be defined with respect to three types of edges:
ui(n
ea
i , n
eb
i , n
ec
i ) = n
ea
i α+ n
eb
i β + n
ec
i γ,
SW (nea , neb , nec) = 2neaα+ 2nebβ + 2necγ,
where neai , n
eb
i , n
ec
i denote the number of its incident A-edges, B-edges, C-edges,
and nea , neb , nec denote the total number of A-edges, B-edges, C-edges in the
graph: nea = 12
∑
i n
ea
i , n
eb = 12
∑
i n
eb
i , n
ec = 12
∑
i n
ec
i . We define the tu-
ple (neai , n
eb
i , n
ec
i ) as ni and its space is defined as Ni, correspondingly, n =
(nea , neb , nec) ∈ N. Each term times 2 in the social welfare is because each edge
is computed twice for its two incident nodes.
Definition 3.3.
PoA =
maxn∈N SW (n)
minn∈Ne SW (n)
,
where Ne is the space of n in NEs.
It is easy to compute that the optimal value SW (opt) of the social welfare
maxn∈N SW (n) = 2n
eα, where ne is the total number of edges, when the weights
of all edges are equal to α, since α is the maximum value of the weight.
Then the problem is to consider the social welfare for all NEs. It is challenging
since there could be many NEs in this game. We discuss them respectively in
terms of edge types.
For a state n, define the following quotient:
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Definition 3.4.
r(n) = r(nea , neb , nec) =
2(nea + neb + nec)α
2neaα+ 2nebβ + 2necγ
Then
PoA = max
n∈Ne
(r(nea , neb , nec))
We begin bounding this quotient by decomposing G into two subgraphs.
Definition 3.5. Define Ψ = (HΦ, HΛ) be a decomposition of G, where the edge
set E(HΦ) and E(HΛ) form a partition of E(G).
HΦ is defined to be an edge-induced subgraph of G where E(HΦ) contains all
C-edges and those who share endpoints to C-edges.
Consequently, the remaining edges constitute HΛ where E(HΛ) , E(G) −
E(HΦ).
Note under this decomposition, some vertices occur in both HΦ and HΛ,
which is innocuous in our analysis since the payoffs reside on edges rather than
vertices. One can view that nodes are duplicated as needed during the decom-
position.
Definition 3.6. For a Nash equilibrium n = (nea , neb , nec) in G, denote the cor-
responding states in HΦ and HΛ as nΦ = (n
ea
Φ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ ) and nΛ = (n
ea
Λ , n
eb
Λ , n
ec
Λ )
where neaΦ + n
ea
Λ = n
ea , nebΦ + n
eb
Λ = n
eb , and necΦ + n
ec
Λ = n
ec .
From Definition 3.5, for any state n and the corresponding nΛ and nΦ, it
satisfies the following properties. i) There is no C-edge in nΛ, i.e. n
ec
Λ = 0. ii)
Every edge in nΦ either is a C-edge or shares an endpoint to a C-edge.
Lemma 3.1. For any NE n in G, the corresponding nΦ and nΛ are also NEs
in HΦ and HΛ.
Proof. nΛ is apparently an NE in HΛ since no C-edges exist in HΛ, which
implies that within each connected component in HΛ, all players play the same
strategy.
And for nΦ, consider a vertex u ∈ V (HΦ):
If u is the endpoint of an C-edge: Since all of its neighbors in G are in HΦ
by definition, it must still satisfy the NE condition, since all players in G
satisfy the NE condition.
If u is not the endpoint of any C-edges: All of its neighbors play the same
strategy as u does, which gives u no incentive to deviate.
⊓⊔
Theorem 3.1. For any graph G, any Nash Equilibrium n = (nea , neb , nec), and
a decomposition Ψ = (HΦ, HΛ)
r(n) ≤ max(r(nΦ), r(nΛ))
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Proof.
r(n) =
2(nea + neb + nec)α
2neaα+ 2nebβ + 2necγ
=
2(neaΦ + n
eb
Φ + n
ec
Φ + n
ea
Λ + n
eb
Λ + n
ec
Λ )α
2(neaΦ + n
ea
Λ )α+ 2(n
eb
Φ + n
eb
Λ )β + 2(n
ec
Φ + n
ec
Λ )γ
=
2(neaΦ + n
eb
Φ + n
ec
Φ )α+ 2(n
ea
Λ + n
eb
Λ + n
ec
Λ )α
(2neaΦ α+ 2n
eb
Φ β + 2n
ec
Φ γ) + (2n
ea
Λ α+ 2n
eb
Λ β + 2n
ec
Λ γ)
≤ max(
2(neaΦ + n
eb
Φ + n
ec
Φ )α
2neaΦ α+ 2n
eb
Φ β + 2n
ec
Φ γ
,
2(neaΛ + n
eb
Λ + n
ec
Λ )α
2neaΛ α+ 2n
eb
Λ β + 2n
ec
Λ γ
)
= max(r(nΦ), r(nΛ))
⊓⊔
We begin with bounding r(nΛ).
Theorem 3.2. For any NE n, the corresponding nΛ under the decomposition
satisfies:
r(nΛ) ≤
α
β
Proof. Assume nΛ = (n
ea
Λ , n
eb
Λ , 0),
r(nΛ) =
2(neaΛ + n
eb
Λ )α
2neaΛ α+ 2n
eb
Λ β
≤
α
β
.
⊓⊔
Before we move on to the discussion of HΦ, we first generalize n,ni to non-
negative rational numbers rather than natural numbers.
Remark 3.1. Since the quotient r(n) remains constant while scaling the state
n by a factor, it suffices to attain a fractional solution n whose nea , neb and nec
are non-negative rational numbers in order to find the worst NE compared to
the optimal social welfare.
For instance, if we conclude that the state n = (12 ,
1
2 , 1) maximizes r(n) among
all (fractional) Nash equilibria, we could scale n to a integral state n′ = (1, 1, 2),
while remaining the same quotient r(n′) = 4α
α+β+2γ = r(n). Therefore, n
′ is also
an worst NE.
Now we consider an NE nΦ = (n
ea
Φ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ ) in HΦ as well as the correspond-
ing quotient r(nΦ).
Remark 3.2.
∂r(neaΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ )
∂neaΦ
= α
nebΦ (β − α) + n
ec
Φ (γ − α)
(neaΦ α+ n
eb
Φ β + n
ec
Φ γ)
2
≤ 0 (1)
∂r(neaΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ )
∂nebΦ
= α
neaΦ (α− β) + n
ec
Φ (γ − β)
(neaΦ α+ n
eb
Φ β + n
ec
Φ γ)
2
(2)
∂r(neaΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ )
∂necΦ
= α
neaΦ (α− γ) + n
eb
Φ (β − γ)
(neaΦ α+ n
eb
Φ β + n
ec
Φ γ)
2
≥ 0 (3)
Price of Anarchy of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks 7
Definition 3.7. For one C-edge, we call one of its endpoints using strategy A
as A-player and the other endpoint using strategy B as B-player.
We have the following properties:
Lemma 3.2.
neaΦ ≥
β − γ
2(α− γ)
necΦ
nebΦ ≥
α− γ
2(β − γ)
necΦ
Proof. We provide a proof for neaΦ , which can be symmetrically applied to n
eb
Φ .
Denote the set of all A-players in HΦ as A .
Since nΦ is an NE,
∀i ∈ A : ui(n
ea
i , 0, n
ec
i ) ≥ ui(0, n
ec
i , n
ea
i )
⇒ neai α+ n
ec
i γ ≥ n
ea
i γ + n
ec
i β
⇒ neai ≥
β − γ
α− γ
neci
neaΦ ≥
1
2
∑
i∈A
neai ≥
β − γ
2(α− γ)
∑
i∈A
neci =
β − γ
2(α− γ)
necΦ
The first inequality holds because each A-edge can be shared by at most
two A-players, while the last equation holds because no C-edges can be shared
between A-players. ⊓⊔
We then bound r(nΦ):
Theorem 3.3. For any NE n, the corresponding nΦ under the decomposition
satisfies:
r(nΦ) ≤
α(α + β − 2γ)
αβ − γ2
Proof. From Remark 3.2, we know that r(neaΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ ) is monotone decreasing
with neaΦ . Substituting n
ea
Φ with its lower bound in Lemma 3.2:
r(neaΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ ) ≤ r(
β − γ
2(α− γ)
necΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ )
From Equation 2 of Remark 3.2,
∂r( β−γ2(α−γ)n
ec
Φ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ )
∂nebΦ
= α
( β−γ2(α−γ)n
ec
Φ )(α− β) + n
ec
Φ (γ − β)
(neaΦ α+ n
eb
Φ β + n
ec
Φ γ)
2
=
α
Z2
·
(β − γ)(2γ − α− β)
2(α− γ)
≤ 0
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where Z2 is a positive normalizing factor. Therefore, r( β−γ2(α−γ)n
ec
Φ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ ) is
monotone decreasing with respect to nebΦ .
Consequently,
r(neaΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ ) ≤ r(
β − γ
2(α − γ)
necΦ , n
eb
Φ , n
ec
Φ )
≤ r(
β − γ
2(α − γ)
necΦ ,
α− γ
2(β − γ)
necΦ , n
ec
Φ )
=
α( β−γ2(α−γ)n
ec
Φ +
α−γ
2(β−γ)n
ec
Φ + n
ec
Φ )
β−γ
2(α−γ)αn
ec
Φ +
α−γ
2(β−γ)βn
ec
Φ + γn
ec
Φ
=
α(α+ β − 2γ)
αβ − γ2
⊓⊔
Our Main Theorem follows combining Theorem. 3.1, Theorem. 3.2 and The-
orem. 3.3.
Theorem 3.4 (Main Theorem). For any given α, β, and γ:
PoA = max
n∈Ne
(r(n)) ≤
α(α + β − 2γ)
αβ − γ2
To provide more insights into how bad an NE can be compared to the optimal
social welfare, we now present some discussions on the upper bound given in
Theorem 3.4.
Remark 3.3. α(α+β−2γ)
αβ−γ2
is monotone decreasing with respect to γ.
Proof. Denote α(α+β−2γ)
αβ−γ2
as p(α, β, γ).
∂p(α, β, γ)
∂γ
= −
2α(α− γ)(β − γ)
(αβ − γ2)2
≤ 0
⊓⊔
Remark 3.3 matches the intuition that Nash equilibria get better as more
compatibility is introduced. As the compatibility between the innovation and
the status quo increases, the switching barrier preventing the users adopting the
innovation diminishes, which encourages more users to adopt the innovation,
hence improving the social welfare at an NE.
Extremely, when γ = β, which means the innovation provides perfect com-
patibility with the status quo, the upper bound in Theorem 3.4 reduces to α
β
. In
this case, there are no C-edges, and the worst NE is the one in which all users
taking B strategy (the status quo), yielding a Price of Anarchy of exactly α
β
.
On the other hand, the case where no compatibility exists (γ = 0), which is a
commonly studied case in many previous works, has the worst Price of Anarchy,
as stated in Corollary 3.1.
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Corollary 3.1. For any given α and β:
PoA ≤
α
β
+ 1
regardless of the value of γ.
Proof. From Remark 3.3, for any fixed α and β, the worst PoA is achieved
when γ = 0.
This corollary follows when substituting γ with 0 in Theorem 3.4. ⊓⊔
4 Tightness of the PoA Upper Bound
Proposition 4.1. The upper bound of PoA given in Theorem 3.4 is tight for
any given α,β and γ.
From the proof in Section 3, it can be deduced that the PoA upper bound can
be achieved when HΛ is empty and
neaΦ =
β − γ
2(α− γ)
necΦ
nebΦ =
α− γ
2(β − γ)
necΦ
The intuition of yielding such a Nash equilibrium is to ensure each A-edge
is shared by two A-players and symmetrically each B-edge is shared by two B-
players, which could minimize the number of A-edges and B-edges for a given
number of C-edges, resulting a worst NE.
There is, however, a caveat when constructing the worst NE for a given tuple
of (α, β, γ) that the lower bound in Lemma 3.2 is not always achievable for any
graph, which is elaborated in Lemma 4.1, a stronger version of Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 4.1.
neaΦ ≥ max(
β − γ
α− γ
necΦ −
1
2
necΦ (n
ec
Φ − 1),
β − γ
2(α− γ)
necΦ )
nebΦ ≥ max(
α− γ
β − γ
necΦ −
1
2
necΦ (n
ec
Φ − 1),
α− γ
2(β − γ)
necΦ )
Proof. We only provide a proof for neaΦ ≥
β−γ
(α−γ)n
ec
Φ −
1
2n
ec
Φ (n
ec
Φ − 1), which
can be symmetrically applied to nebΦ . And the other part has been proved in
Lemma 3.2.
Similar to Lemma 3.2, denote the set of all A-players in HΦ as A .
From Lemma 3.2:
∀i ∈ A : neai ≥
β − γ
α− γ
neci
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Since each C-edge has one A-player, there are at most necΦ A-players. And
since there is at most one edge between each pair of players:
neaΦ ≥
∑
i∈A
neai −
necΦ (n
ec
Φ − 1)
2
≥
β − γ
α− γ
necΦ −
necΦ (n
ec
Φ − 1)
2
⊓⊔
Therefore, in order to construct an NE where neaΦ =
β−γ
2(α−γ)n
ec
Φ and n
eb
Φ =
α−γ
2(β−γ)n
ec
Φ , it is necessary that
β − γ
α− γ
necΦ −
1
2
necΦ (n
ec
Φ − 1) ≤
β − γ
2(α− γ)
necΦ
and
α− γ
β − γ
necΦ −
1
2
necΦ (n
ec
Φ − 1) ≤
α− γ
2(β − γ)
necΦ
Solving these two inequalities:
necΦ ≥
α− γ
β − γ
+ 1 (4)
The intuition for Lemma 4.1 is that to share a given number of A-edges or
B-edges, enough A-players or B-players are needed. For instance, if there are
2 B-players in total, then at most 1 B-edge can be shared between them. To
achieve an NE, a specific number of B-edges are needed. It is hence necessary to
have enough C-edges to produce enough B-players to ensure that each of these
B-edges can be shared by two B-players.
Now a Nash equilibrium n = (nea , neb , nec) yielding the PoA bound shown
in Theorem 3.4 can be constructed as follows:
– First construct a fractional NE n
• Construct nec = α−γ
β−γ
+ 1 C-edges.
• For each A-player, create β−γ
α−γ
half-A-edges, and α−γ
β−γ
half-B-edges.
• Group those half-edges into pairs, yielding nea = β−γ2(α−γ)n
ec A-edges and
neb = α−γ2(β−γ)n
ec B-edges.
– Then scale n to an integral solution
From the argument in Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 4.1, the resulting state
n = (
β − γ
2(α− γ)
nec ,
α− γ
2(β − γ)
nec , nec)
is an NE, where nec = α−γ
β−γ
+ 1.
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Therefore,
SW (OPT )
SW (n)
=
2α(nea + neb + nec)
2αnea + 2βneb + 2γnec
=
α( β−γ2(α−γ)n
ec + α−γ2(β−γ)n
ec + nec)
α β−γ2(α−γ)n
ec + β α−γ2(β−γ)n
ec + γnec
=
α( β−γ2(α−γ) +
α−γ
2(β−γ) + 1)
α β−γ2(α−γ) + β
α−γ
2(β−γ) + γ
=
α(α + β − 2γ)
αβ − γ2
To better illustrate how this can be done, we give two concrete examples in
the case of (α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0) and (α = 3, β = 2, γ = 1).
For (α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0), PoA has an upper bound of 1(1+1−0)1·1−0 = 2. We can
construct a fractional NE n = (12 ,
1
2 , 1) following the aforementioned mechanism.
When scaling up, we get n = (1, 1, 2).
Figure 1 shows such an NE in which the social welfare SW = α+β+2γ = 2,
while the optimal SW is OPT = (1 + 1 + 2)α = 4 = 2SW .
A B
BA
1 1
0
0
Fig. 1: An NE with SW = 1
2
OPT for (α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0)
For (α = 3, β = 2, γ = 1) with PoA ≤ 3(3+2−2)3·2−1 =
9
5 , n
ec = α−γ
β−γ
+ 1 = 3.
Then the constructed fractional NE n = (34 , 3, 3). We get n = (1, 4, 4).
And a graph depicting such a state is shown in Figure 2. The state shown
is a NE with social welfare SW = 2α + 8β + 8γ = 30. And the optimal SW is
OPT = 18α = 54 = 95SW .
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a tight upper bound for the Price of Anarchy of the
cascading behavior in social networks, which has long been used to model a
variety of social behaviors such as the diffusion of innovation, the adoption of
novel conduct, etc.
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B B
B B
A A3
2
2
22
1
11
1
Fig. 2: An NE with SW = 5
9
OPT for (α = 3, β = 2, γ = 1)
We discuss the cascading behavior in a networked coordination game setting
in which nodes are individuals in the social network and edges denote relationship
that influence can be exerted over. Two behaviors (the innovation A and the
status quo B) exist in the game, and if two adjacent individuals adopt the same
behavior, they will both receive the corresponding payoff depending on which
behavior they adopt, where the payoff of A is inherently higher than (or equal
to) B. However, if they do not play coordinately, they will receive a less payoff
which can be interpreted as the compatibility between the two behaviors.
This game is known to have numerous Nash equilibria depending on the
payoffs as well as on the network topology. Previous work seldom quantitatively
address how bad a Nash equilibrium can be. To the best of our knowledge, even
the question that whether the PoA is bounded for a given setting of payoffs
remained elusive until this paper.
In this work we showed that the Price of Anarchy can be slightly worse than
the case where all players take B. However, it is pretty close to the worst Nash
equilibrium, which even in the worst case that the compatibility between A and
B is 0, still has a PoA upper bound of α
β
+ 1, where α and β are the payoffs of
A and B respectively.
In the future, it would be desirable to see whether the PoA upper bound
can be generalized to the game with heterogeneous payoffs instead of a universal
payoff for all edges. One may also consider a more sophisticated way of introduc-
ing compatibility into this model such as in [7] where an extra strategy to adopt
both A and B with an additional cost is introduced. It would be interesting to
know whether and how the PoA upper bound can be adapted to those models.
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